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After	Italy’s	vote:	The	case	for	a	deal	between	the
Democratic	Party	and	the	Five	Star	Movement
Italy’s	election	produced	a	fragmented	result	and	there	has	been	intense	speculation	over
the	potential	government	that	could	emerge	from	negotiations.	Andrea	Lorenzo
Capussela	and	Gianfranco	Pasquino	argue	that	in	a	tri-polar	parliament	dominated	by
populists	of	different	descriptions,	a	cabinet	centred	on	some	form	of	understanding
between	the	Democratic	Party	and	the	Five	Star	Movement	would	be	the	least	bad	option
from	the	perspective	of	both	Italy’s	and	Europe’s	interests.	At	the	very	least,	the	logic	of
parliamentary	democracy	requires	the	two	parties	to	engage	in	serious	talks.
Palazzo	Montecitorio,	seat	of	the	Italian	Chamber	of	Deputies,	Credit:	David	Macchi	(CC	BY-NC-ND	2.0)
The	Italian	election	produced	three	surprises.	The	centre-right	coalition	came	first,	as	predicted,	but	within	it	voters
largely	preferred	the	anti-establishment	rhetoric	of	Lega	–	the	radical-right	party	formerly	known	as	the	Northern
League,	which	recently	shed	its	original	secessionism	to	embrace	sovereignism	–	to	the	more	ambiguous	liberal-
populism	of	Silvio	Berlusconi’s	party,	Forza	Italia.	They	punished	the	ruling	Democratic	Party	(PD)	more	harshly	than
expected,	and	rewarded	the	anti-establishment	Five	Star	Movement	(M5S)	more	generously	than	expected.
Like	the	PD,	Berlusconi’s	party	scored	the	worst	result	of	its	history.	Except	in	2011-13,	when	both	supported	a	non-
partisan	executive,	those	two	parties	or	their	predecessors	–	the	alliance	that	merged	into	the	PD	in	2007	–	have
either	led	the	government	or	the	opposition	ever	since	1994.	Although	much	divided	them	and	their	policies,	they
jointly	presided	over	the	country’s	singular	and	remarkable	decline,	which	began	then.	Suffice	it	to	say	that	during	the
2000s	average	per-capita	real	growth	was	the	lowest	in	the	world,	and	average	real	disposable	income	is	now	at
about	the	same	level	as	it	was	in	1995:	in	Italy’s	closest	Eurozone	peers	–	France,	Germany,	and	Spain	–	it	is	about
25%	higher.	Their	joint	defeat	suggests	that	an	opportunity	might	have	opened	for	the	country	to	gradually	shift
toward	a	fairer	and	more	efficient	equilibrium.
Before	turning	to	the	implications	for	the	formation	of	the	next	government,	however,	a	brief	look	at	the	composition
and	policy	orientation	of	the	three	poles	that	dominate	parliament,	shown	in	the	table	below,	might	be	useful.	For	two
of	these	poles	are	fairly	loose	coalitions,	and	the	solidity	of	the	third	cannot	be	taken	for	granted,	especially	when	one
considers	that	during	the	2013-18	parliament,	36.7	per	cent	of	MPs	switched	sides,	often	more	than	once	(347	out	of
945	elected	MPs	officially	switched	sides,	and	566	switches	were	recorded).
Table:	Selected	results	from	the	2018	Italian	election
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Note:	The	seats	shown	in	the	table	are	preliminary	figures.	Two	seats	are	as	yet	unassigned	in	either	chamber;	in	the	Senate,	the
count	covers	elected	seats	only.	†	In	a	slightly	different	composition	between	the	two	elections.	‡	With	a	different	name	and
composition	between	the	two	elections.	Source:	Official	data
Besides	Lega	and	Berlusconi’s	party,	the	centre-right	coalition	comprises	a	post-fascist	grouping	(‘Brothers	of	Italy’	in
the	table)	and	a	smaller	cartel	of	patronage	networks.	It	is	held	together	by	history	(they	governed	together	in	1994,
2001-6,	and	2008-11),	by	an	equally	long	tradition	of	tolerance	for	illegality	and	clientelism	and	impatience	for
pluralism	and	constitutional	democracy,	by	varying	degrees	of	opposition	to	immigration,	nationalism,	and
Euroscepticism,	which	only	Berlusconi’s	party	muted	during	the	campaign,	and	by	a	fairly	extreme	flat-tax	proposal
(the	suggested	rates	are	15	or	23	per	cent).	But	Lega’s	virulent	anti-establishment	rhetoric,	which	undoubtedly
contributed	to	the	quadrupling	of	its	votes,	distances	it	markedly	from	its	partners.
The	Five	Star	Movement	deliberately	ran	alone.	But	its	lack	of	either	a	recognisable	political	culture	or	a	reliable
method	for	selecting	candidates,	its	weak	internal	democracy,	and	its	short	history	suggest	that	exits	are	possible	(it
lost	32.7	per	cent	of	its	parliamentarians	in	2013-18).	Although	it	too	seems	impatient	with	pluralism,	its	anti-political
views	do	not	extend	to	a	rejection	of	constitutional	democracy	and	the	checks	and	balances	system.	On	the	contrary,
its	overall	stance	is	couched	primarily	in	terms	of	transparency	and	public	integrity,	and	its	support	for	judicial	and
political	accountability	survived	the	first	large	scandals	in	which	the	party	was	implicated.	To	this	foundational
message	the	M5S	recently	added	the	proposal	of	a	form	of	universal	basic	income,	it	softened	its	Euroscepticism,
and	seems	to	have	shelved	its	opposition	to	the	common	currency.
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The	centre-left	coalition	is	far	less	balanced	than	its	ideological	alternative.	None	of	the	PD’s	three	allies	reached	the
3	per	cent	threshold,	and	within	them	only	two	figures	carry	some	influence:	Emma	Bonino,	who	led	a	grouping	of
pro-European	libertarians,	and	the	former	leader	of	a	centrist	party	that	was	allied	to	Berlusconi	until	the	2010s.	The
coalition	ran	on	the	record	of	the	2013-18	PD-led	cabinets,	promising	greater	efforts	on	unemployment,	poverty,	and
equality	of	opportunity.	It	advocated	further	European	integration,	ever	a	pillar	of	the	PD’s	stance,	but	gave	this	issue
modest	prominence.	More	importantly,	several	choices	of	candidates,	especially	in	the	South,	appeared	to	indicate
that	the	weight	of	clientelism	has	grown	within	that	party.
Arithmetic	and	policy	compatibility	suggest	that	the	next	government	could	be	built	upon	three	alternative	majorities,
whether	formal	(coalition	cabinets)	or	informal	(parliamentary	support	for	minority	executives):	the	M5S	and	the	PD,
with	or	without	the	latter’s	allies	or,	in	their	stead,	a	small	leftist	grouping	(‘Free	and	Equal’	in	the	table);	centre-right
and	centre-left;	and	M5S	and	Lega.	A	non-partisan	government	supported	by	most	parties	is	a	fourth	option,	which
would	probably	be	pursued	if	those	three	fail,	as	an	alternative	to	snap	elections.	But	such	a	cabinet	would
presumably	have	the	mandate	merely	of	steering	the	country	while	parliament	designs	a	better	electoral	law:	one,	for
instance,	which	allowed	citizens	to	select	their	representatives.
The	background	against	which	these	alternatives	must	be	set	is	well	known.	Domestically,	the	growth	acceleration	of
2017	is	likely	to	slow	down,	and	the	exceptionally	favourable	external	macroeconomic	environment	of	the	past	few
years	will	gradually	revert	to	normality.	In	Europe,	the	renewed	Franco-German	alliance	does	seem	set	to	give
impetus	to	EU	and	Eurozone	reform,	but	faces	both	risks	and	obstacles	–	such	as,	for	example,	an	unhelpful	US
administration,	a	hostile	Russia,	and	dangerous	relations	between	the	two.	It	will	also	have	to	address	the
(legitimate)	demands	and	reservations	of	an	informal	grouping	of	mainly	Northern	and	North-Eastern	smaller
member	states.	Italy	must	choose	a	strategy	and	can	indeed	influence	the	outcome	of	this	debate,	which	could
shape	the	future	of	the	continent	for	a	decade	or	more.
Let	us	assume,	for	simplicity,	that	the	centre-right’s	interests	are	on	the	whole	less	aligned	to	the	needs	of	Italy’s
material	and	democratic	development	than	those	of	the	other	parties,	as	recent	history	arguably	suggests,	and	that
greater	European	integration	is	desirable,	at	least	if	greater	doses	of	democracy	and	accountability	will	infuse	the
common	institutions.	On	these	assumptions,	admittedly	subjective,	it	can	readily	be	shown	that	only	the	first
alternative	(a	deal	between	the	M5S	and	the	PD)	could	potentially	advance	both	Italy’s	and	Europe’s	needs.
With	inverted	roles,	a	left-right	coalition	would	resemble	the	2013-18	ones,	which	included	either	Berlusconi’s	party
or,	de	facto,	segments	of	it.	They	achieved	little	on	either	front.	A	right-led	coalition	would	likely	do	worse.	Meanwhile,
Lega’s	flat	tax	(15	per	cent)	and	the	Five	Star	Movement’s	universal	basic	income	proposals	are	mutually
incompatible.	An	alliance	between	them	could	thus	lead	the	populists	within	the	M5S	to	follow	Lega’s	example	in	the
search	for	scapegoats:	immigrants,	Brussels,	the	euro,	and	others.	Italy	and	probably	also	the	EU	are	highly	unlikely
to	survive	unscathed.
Conversely,	the	M5S	and	the	PD	could	find	common	ground	on	a	genuinely	universalistic,	sustainable,	and	pro-
growth	reform	of	social	insurance,	on	the	fight	against	corruption	and	tax	evasion,	and,	possibly,	also	on	public
administration	reform	and	a	pro-growth	public	expenditure	review.	Over	five	years,	a	meaningful	degree	of
implementation	of	almost	any	plausible	programme	built	along	these	lines	would	make	Italy	a	distinctly	better
country.
The	pre-conditions	for	such	a	compact	are	that	the	M5S	pledges	support	for	greater	European	integration,	upon	a
sufficiently	clear	platform,	and	that	the	PD	distances	itself	from	collusion	with	the	economic	elites,	clientelism,	and
the	other	unethical	practices	that	increasingly	permeated	it.	Cooperation	could	improve	both	sides	of	the	deal,	in
other	words.	The	main	risks	are	friction,	deadlock,	and	break-up.	They	are	serious,	of	course,	but	could	be	reduced
by	following	the	German	example:	a	detailed	and	transparent	coalition	agreement,	made	after	comprehensive
negotiations	and	public	intra-party	discussion	and	deliberation.	The	PD	and	even	more	the	M5S	have	a	lot	to	learn
for	such	a	demanding	process	to	work,	but	nothing	prevents	them	from	giving	it	a	try.
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Having	narrowly	won	the	2013	election,	the	PD	offered	a	roughly	similar	alliance	to	the	M5S	but	was	mockingly
rebuffed.	Stung	by	defeat	and	by	that	precedent,	the	PD	has	so	far,	perhaps	tactically,	rejected	the	Five	Star
Movement’s	informal	overtures.	The	reasons	offered	boil	down	to	these:	cooperation	with	the	M5S	is	not	what	voters
want	and	would	damage	the	party.	It	could	harm	the	existing	party,	arguably,	but	might	make	it	a	better	one.	Above
all,	both	Italy’s	and	Europe’s	interests	and	the	very	logic	of	parliamentary	democracy	require	the	two	sides	to	engage
in	serious	talks.	Talks	held	according	to	established	practice	(the	largest	party	should	lay	down	the	platform),	with
reasonable	safeguards	(an	adequate	mixture	of	transparency,	on	strategic	choices,	and	confidentiality,	on	tactical
ones),	and	an	open	horizon	(leading	to	either	a	formal	coalition	or	external	support	for	a	minority	government,	and
potentially	encompassing	also	other	parties	or	figures).
Please	read	our	comments	policy	before	commenting.
Note:	This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	not	the	position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the
London	School	of	Economics.
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